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In response to fundamental changes in regulation and technology, the financial
industry around the world is undergoing an unprecedented wave of consolidation. A
growing body of empirical literature has attempted to measure the efficiency gains from
M&As; however there is little sense of how the results might depend on the country,
industry and time period analysed. In this paper we review critically works that cover
the main sectors of the financial industry (commercial and investment banks, insurance
and asset management companies) in the major industrialized countries over the last
twenty years, searching for common patterns that transcend national and sectoral
peculiarities. We find that consolidation in the financial sector is beneficial up to a
relatively small size in order to reap economies of scale, but there is little evidence that
mergers yield economies of scope or gains in managerial efficiency.
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The last fifteen years have witnessed an unprecedented number of mergers and
acquisitions (M&As) in most countries, in mature and innovative sectors alike, from
retailing to telecommunications. According to Thomson Financial, there were 34,147
M&As between 1996 and 2001, compared with 19,996 between 1990 and 1995 (see
Table 1). The total value of transactions rose from $1,390 billion to $8,135 billion.
M&A activity was especially pronounced in the financial sector. Over 10,000
financial firms were acquired in the major industrial countries from 1990 to 2001,
including 246 deals in which the acquired firm had a market value greater than $1
billion. The level of activity increased toward the end of the decade for all types of
acquisitions: there were 93 deals worth more than $1 billion in the six years from 1990
to 1996 and 153 between 1997 and 2001. Both within-industry and cross-industry deals
increased in intensity. The rate of consolidation has soared both domestically and
internationally, but the great majority of M&A activity still involves firms from the
same country.
2
The main motivations for this unprecedented wave of consolidation in the
financial sector are common to most countries. In response to fundamental changes in
regulation and technology, financial institutions have attempted to improve their
efficiency and attract new customers by increasing their geographical reach and the
range of products they offer. The desire to preserve falling margins by increasing
market share and to attract new customers is often fulfilled by way of M&As that allow
                                                                
1 The opinions expressed in this paper are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of
the Board of Governors, the Ministry of Finance of Canada or the Banca d’Italia. This paper draws
heavily on our preliminary work for Chapter V of the G-10 Report on Financial Sector Consolidation. We
thank for their comments and suggestions Dominik Egli, Myron Kwast, Stephen Rhoades and Gerry
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2  See Group of Ten (2001), pp. 31-42.Table 1
of which: of which: of which: of which:
Number Total value Number Total value Number Total value Number Total value Number Total value Number Total value Number Total value Number Total value
$ billions % of GDP $ billions % of GDP $ billions $ billions $ billions $ billions $ billions $ billions
Australia 628 29.5 1.5 1,423 91.7 4.0 136 4.5 53 2.4 23 1.1 268 25.2 91 13.2 22 3.3
Belgium 251 7.1 0.5 354 57.8 3.9 67 4.5 21 0.8 18 2.7 70 32.9 34 28.1 12 1.0
Canada 1,421 41.6 1.2 2,888 287.4 7.3 156 3.9 52 1.6 19 0.9 321 36.0 112 15.0 42 8.8
France 1,663 81.9 1.0 1,563 269.6 3.2 314 25.5 148 11.8 21 2.9 227 73.7 96 44.6 42 21.0
Germany 1,913 37.3 0.3 3,039 437.0 3.5 234 11.0 123 2.4 39 6.2 379 82.6 229 68.6 46 12.7
Italy 852 55.0 0.8 1,048 198.2 2.9 251 24.8 147 19.2 33 4.9 236 97.6 138 80.4 44 13.4
Japan 216 56.1 0.2 2,291 234.5 0.9 46 45.4 29 44.4 2 0.2 491 138.1 236 119.1 48 15.3
Netherland 565 25.6 1.3 635 127.2 5.5 123 14.5 36 10.9 38 3.3 88 33.9 24 5.9 22 21.9
Spain 510 25.6 0.8 1,042 99.3 2.8 120 8.3 66 5.9 35 2.3 153 34.2 67 31.2 42 1.1
Sweden 473 33.8 2.4 793 126.0 8.9 84 4.1 44 2.8 7 81 21.2 38 16.9 6 2.8
Switzerland 412 14.6 1.0 485 85.9 5.6 111 4.9 81 3.3 9 1.2 87 35.2 43 24.2 14 9.7
United Kingdom 2,349 170.9 2.7 4,484 848.6 10.3 386 41.4 140 33.0 77 2.0 750 226.1 279 114.4 141 76.0
United States 8,743 811.2 2.1 14,102 5,272.3 9.7 2,341 205.3 1,691 156.6 275 25.6 2,902 1,138.2 1,796 754.9 364 192.5
Total Main Industrial 
Countries 
(4)
of which: Euro Area 19,996 1,390.2 1.3 34,147 8,135.5 6.1 4,369 398.2 2,631 295.1 596 53.3 6,053 1,974.9 3,183 1,316.6 845 379.4
6,767 256.0 0.7 9,696 1,310.3 3.4 1,317 99.8 655 59.6 227 24.1 1,406 412.3 700 302.8 249 79.2
World 26,062 1,570.3 50,787 8,960.2 5,725 460.9 3,363 340.3 773 62.1 9,777 2,232.9 4,781 1,494.9 1,328 418.7
Sources: Thomson Financial and SDC Platinum.
(1) Mergers and acquisitions involving majority interests. (2) The sectors refer to that of the company being acquired. (3) Includes: Commercial Banks, Bank Holding Companies, Saving and Loans,
Mutual Savings Banks, Credit Institutions, Real Estate; Mortgage Bankers and Brokers. (4) G10 countries, Australia and Spain.
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financial institutions to rapidly increase their size and to improve their knowledge of
new products and markets.
There are several ways in which M&As can improve efficiency. First, the larger
firms that result from consolidation may gain access to cost-saving technologies or
spread their fixed costs over a larger base, thus reducing average costs. Efficiency gains
may also derive from the exploitation of economies of scope: the deal may allow the
merging parties to enter new markets and cross-sell their products to a wider customer
base. Finally, consolidation may improve managerial efficiency.
M&As on the scale witnessed by the financial sector in the last decade have
profound effects on the firms involved, their competitors and their customers. Yet, the
effect of consolidation on the performance of the institutions involved is not well
understood. In particular, the extent of exploitable scale and scope economies might be
smaller than commonly thought, and efficiency gains resulting from better management
might be elusive in large, complex institutions.
These considerations apply to most industries that have undergone a wave of
consolidation in the nineties,
3 but they are particularly relevant from a policy
perspective for the financial industry. Social costs arising from M&As can take three
forms. First, for some financial products (in particular deposits and small business
lending) markets are mainly local; therefore, M&As among operators with large market
shares might cause adverse price changes, harming consumers.
4 Second, M&As might
contribute to diverting the focus of some participants from small business lending,
which relies on soft information at the local level, to less custom-made products that are
more easily manageable within large organizations.
5 Third, consolidation can increase
the risk of the operators involved, both at the individual level (by generating large and
complex institutions that may suffer from diseconomies of scale) and at the systemic
                                                                
3 See Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001).
4 See Prager and Hannan (1998) and Focarelli and Panetta (2002) for deposits and Sapienza (2002) for
loans.
5 See Berger, Saunders, Scalise and Udell (1998) and Berger, Miller,Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2002).12
level.
6 Therefore, quantifying efficiency gains from M&As for the financial sector
becomes extremely important as a first step towards analyzing the trade-off between
these gains and the potential adverse effects.
In this paper we organize what is by now an established body of research on
M&As and efficiency in the financial sector along industry and country lines, in order to
shed light on common features and understand the main differences. This review differs
from others
7 in that, while not pretending to be exhaustive, it attempts to reach a level of
generality by covering most industrialized countries (the U.S., Europe, Japan, Australia,
and Canada) and financial industries (commercial banks, insurance and asset
management companies and investment banks). This way, we are able to confirm that
some patterns are independent of institutional features and measurement techniques,
while others may be industry- or country-specific.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we review what is generally meant
by efficiency improvement. We then gauge the impact of consolidation on the
performance of financial institutions on the basis of a review of the evidence available
for the main industrialized countries on the effect of M&As on the efficiency of
commercial banks (section 3), insurance companies (section 4), investment banks and
asset management companies (section 5). In section 6 we describe briefly the impact of
cross-border and cross-industry transactions. Section 7 concludes.
2. How Do We Measure Efficiency?
Efficiency is a broad concept that can be applied to many dimensions of a firm’s
activities. In this section we review briefly the most commonly used indicators of
efficiency.
According to narrow technical definitions, a firm is cost efficient if it minimizes
costs for a given quantity of output; it is profit efficient if it maximizes profits for a
                                                                
6 Chapter III of the report by the Group of Ten (2001) discusses the effect of consolidation on risk.
7 See, e.g., Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999).13
given combination of inputs and outputs. These two definitions take size and technology
as given and focus on how production factors are combined, by comparing a firm’s
actual costs or profits with the costs or profits of the best practice institution.
Consolidation may increase efficiency, by transferring superior managerial skills from
the bidder to the target. However, the opposite may also happen, for example when the
managers of the bidder enter into new geographic or product markets or when the
merger is motivated by empire-building strategies pursued by relatively inefficient
managers.
A broader concept of efficiency considers scale and scope economies: an efficient
firm is one that reaches the optimal size for its industry (scale) and that produces the
optimal mix of products given the prices of their production factors (scope). Scale
economies often arise from the ability of larger firms to allocate fixed costs, such as
advertising expenses or the cost of technology, across a greater volume of output.
Revenue scale economies can arise if customers prefer to deal with large banks, for
knowledge of customers’ habits, across product lines. Beyond a certain scale or scope,
diseconomies may appear as managers move beyond their areas of expertise or as size
and the internal hierarchical structure of firms reduces the control of owners over
managers. Minimum efficient size and optimal product mix vary with technology,
regulation and consumers’ tastes. Therefore, there could be wide variations in firm
structure across time, industries and countries if firms fully exploit scale and scope
economies.
Different definitions of efficiency call for different measurement methodologies.
The simplest approach consists of comparing balance sheet ratios that describe costs
(e.g., operating costs over gross income) and profitability (e.g., return on assets or on
equity).  However, this methodology does not fully take into account differences in
exogenous prices of inputs and outputs faced by different financial firms (for example
because their market power differs or simply because they are located in different
regions). More complex analyses measure managerial cost and profit efficiency by
comparing firms to the best practice of the industry, as determined by statistical14
methods, taking into account for each institution the inputs, outputs and the prices it
faces.
8
One method estimates a stochastic frontier (a combination of the factors just
mentioned) along which all efficient firms would operate, and the distance of each
actual firm from the frontier is taken as a measure of its (in)efficiency. This method
should be considered with a certain degree of caution, given that it is based on the
presumption that the residuals of the estimated frontier are highly correlated with the
managerial inefficiency of the banks. Since estimated residuals are, by definition, the
portion of the variation in costs or profits that cannot be explained by the model, using
these residuals as measures of efficiency may be problematic. Also, while the extreme
values of cost or profit distributions are often truncated to an arbitrary extent before
stochastic frontiers are estimated, these methods still rely on fairly extreme observations
to determine the behavior of efficient firms, and such observations may be subject to
measurement error to a greater extent than other firms in the sample. Furthermore, many
studies regress residuals on factors that may explain differences in efficiency across
firms. However, it is not clear why such factors are not controlled for in the original
cost or profit function estimation, likely a more efficient way to capture their effects
than through a second regression on estimated residuals.
A second method estimates cost or profit frontiers non-parametrically. This
method assumes that there is no random error in the data; it ascribes all residuals from
the estimation procedure to inefficiency.
In order to evaluate economies of scale and scope, the shape of the frontier, given
by the existing technologies, is investigated: if the performance of firms on the frontier
(i.e., firms that combine optimally the existing resources) would improve by changing
their size or product mix, then there is still room for exploiting economies of scale or
scope.
                                                                
8 Berger and Mester (1997) and Cummins and Weiss (2000) review most estimation techniques and
provide a comprehensive bibliography on the subject for banks and insurance companies respectively.
Therefore, we will just sketch out the most commonly used methods of estimating firm-level efficiency
and the drawbacks of each method.15
Given that both cost and profit functions are duals of the production function,
9 the
choice of which function to study depends on the availability of data, on considerations
on whether input or output prices can be considered truly exogenous, on what kind of
relationships is considered more relevant for the economic analysis at hand. For
example, when trade unions are negotiating the terms of a new contract a relationship of
interest could be the sensitivity of total operating costs to labor costs, while in a
recession it might be more interesting to know the sensitivity of banks’ profits to a
decrease in loans.
The impact of M&As on firm-level efficiency can be gauged in different ways.
For example, several studies investigate the relationship between size and efficiency.
The results provide indirect evidence on the effects of mergers: if larger firms are more
efficient, then presumably mergers will improve performance. This methodology
suffers, however, from a weakness: it assumes that merged institutions are largely
comparable to other larger firms; but the fact that some firms are involved in a merger
while others are not is an indication that they may be different in several (possibly
unobservable) ways. Analyses that focus on the performance of merged institutions
compared with the performance of non-merged ones provide direct evidence on the
relationship between M&As and efficiency.  Both types of research suffer from
drawbacks other than those already mentioned.  Neither controls much for differences in
the quality of output or the riskiness of firms.
10 Product or service quality differences
would likely be attributed to differences in efficiency.
Acknowledging these shortcomings, no one has devised a fully satisfactory
measure of inefficiency and these studies are the only available evidence on the subject.
The direct and indirect approaches are complementary; both provide information on the
consequences of the consolidation process on efficiency. Research usually has been
                                                                
9 To analyze efficiency the object of interest is the production function, i.e. how inputs combine to
produce outputs. However, the data required for its direct estimation are generally not available;
moreover, there are methodological issues pertaining to how to deal with differences in product quality.
Therefore, researchers have generally estimated cost and profit functions, that, under rather general
conditions on the properties of the production function, contain all the relevant information, i.e they are
duals of the production function (see e.g. Diewert (1974)).
10 An exception is Mester (1996).16
conducted by analyzing indirect evidence, mainly because databases on the direct
effects of M&As are generally not available.
Finally, for firms listed on a stock exchange, efficiency gains can be measured on
the basis of stock market performance: a firm is thought to be doing well when its
shares outperform a given benchmark (e.g., the industry average or an index of firms of
comparable size). The overall efficiency gains from a merger are evaluated in terms of
the sum of the market values of the bidder and the target: if the sum increases, the deal
is supposed to create value, and vice versa if it decreases. By assumption, differences in
firm risk are observed perfectly by the capital markets and incorporated in share prices;
if this is not the case, these models would interpret the higher returns that typically
result from increases in firm risk as increases in efficiency.
Differences in regulations, institutions and market structure across countries mean
that conclusions drawn from the analysis of one country should be generalized to others
only very carefully.
11 On the positive side, this means that common patterns that emerge
from an international comparison are particularly informative for a policy debate.
3. Commercial Banks
Before analyzing the empirical evidence, we note three facts about the
commercial banking industry. First, the industry really consists of two product markets:
retail and wholesale banking. Retail banking is oriented towards households and small
firms, while wholesale banking caters to larger firms and other financial institutions. Of
course, many banks provide both services, but this only adds to the complexity of any
empirical analysis. In general, research has not distinguished explicitly between retail
and wholesale banking, although the focus is implicitly on retail banking, where policy
issues regarding competition, regulation and consumer protection are more relevant.
The remainder of this section is mainly concerned with retail banks.
                                                                
11 Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) show that the influence of such environmental factors on
measures of firm efficiency can be significant.17
Second, in countries with a heavily bank-oriented financial system, the banking
industry may evolve differently than in countries where there is more scope for
securities markets activities, in terms both of products offered and risk management.
This should be kept in mind when making international comparisons of cost or revenue
structures or economies of scale and scope. In countries with well-developed financial
markets, banks provide more services than just loans and deposits and are better able to
offload risks, thus maintaining more liquid balance sheets; they may behave differently
from banks that rely more on traditional intermediation activities.
Finally, because of differences in regulation, in some countries commercial and
investment banks are (or have been in the past) strictly separated (e.g., the U.S. until
recently), while in others (such as Germany or Italy) they can operate jointly as
universal banks and even have cross-shareholdings with industrial companies. These
differences make for different market structures and internal organizations, again
hampering international comparisons. All these warnings notwithstanding, the banking
industries in the main industrialized countries share some structural features that emerge
from a careful analysis.
3.1  Aggregate Data
Similarities and differences among North American, European and Japanese
banks emerge from the comparison of basic balance sheet ratios. Such an analysis might
seem naive at first sight, but many studies find that simple accounting ratios are highly
correlated with econometric estimates of efficiency.
12
The relationship between the cost structure and size of North American and
European commercial banks shows some common features: the ratio of operating costs
to gross income is higher for smaller banks (with total assets below $5 billion) and it
decreases from over 60 percent to around 55 percent for banks with assets between $20
billion and $50 billion (see Table 2).
                                                                
12 See, for example, Berger and Mester (1997) and Peristiani (1997).18
Table 2
Size and Performance of Commercial Banks
Area Variables < $5 bill. $5 – $20 bill. $20 –$ 50 bill. > $50 bill.
No. Averag No. Averag No. Averag No. Averag
Non-Int. Income
Gross Income 266 21.5 97 29.2 29 28.2 19 53.4
Operating Costs
Gross Income 266 60.9 96 59.8 29 55.4 19 67.8
North
America
Return on Equity 266 11.2 97 13.5 29 13.5 19 14.1
Non-Int. Income
Gross Income 539 19.2 169 24.6 50 20.2 64 30.8
Operating Costs
Gross Income 543 63.1 183 61.6 55 55.6 63 65.5
Europe
Return on Equity 559 7.1 185 7.4 48 7.2 58 8.2
Non-Int. Income
Gross Income 15 .4 63 9.2 29 8.9 26 30.0
Operating Costs
Gross Income 17 76.9 63 69.5 29 67.9 26 60.4
Japan
Return on Equity 17 -1.3 63 0.1 29 0.5 26 -3.2
Source: Fitch-IBCA data for commercial banks of G-10 countries; banks are ranked by assets in billion
U.S. dollars. All variables are averaged over the 1994-1997 period; the distribution is truncated at the top
and bottom 10 percent.
The largest banks, with assets greater than $50 billion, present the highest costs
(more than 65 percent of gross income). This pattern suggests the existence of
economies of scale up to a certain size, followed by diseconomies for very large banks.
However, profitability rises with total assets: for North American banks the return on
equity increases from 11 to 14 percent from the smallest to the largest size class; for
European banks it increases from 7 to 8 percent.
13 Higher operating costs are
compensated by a lower ratio of equity to total assets, probably an indirect benefit of
increased diversification, and by a higher share of non-interest income (more than 50
                                                                
13 Return on equity, unlike return on assets, is influenced by the capital structure of the bank; however,
given that the capital structure is endogenously determined by the bank’s management, it can also be
considered as part of the measurement of efficiency.19
percent of gross income for North American banks, more than 30 percent for the
others). For Japanese banks the picture is more straightforward: the ratio of operating
costs to gross income decreases as firms become larger; profitability is low or negative
because of the deteriorating economic and financial conditions of the country since the
mid 1990s.
As for managerial efficiency, the dispersion of cost and profitability ratios can be
taken as a proxy for the distance between the best and the worst performers. In North
America, among banks with less than $5 billion of assets, the costs of those in the top
quartile represent 55 percent of gross income and the return on equity is above 15
percent (see Table 3).
Table 3
Dispersion of Performance Measures of Commercial Banks


















Gross Income 26.2 25.3 34.2 24.4 35.7 22.6 74.5 38.1
Operating Costs
Gross Income 55.1 65.7 55.5 64.5 55.2 64.5 63.6 74.1
North
America
Return on Equity 15.2 7.7 17.4 10.1 16.5 11.2 15.5 13.0
Non-Int. Income
Gross Income 23.7 14.2 32.1 15.1 31.9 13.3 37.3 23.9
Operating Costs
Gross Income 57.5 68.7 53.4 70.4 34.4 69.3 58.0 73.8 Europe
Return on Equity 8.8 5.4 9.7 4.7 9.0 5.6 9.9 4.8
Non-Int. Income
Gross Income 13.6 3.5 11.2 7.0 9.8 7.3 41.3 24.9
Operating Costs
Gross Income 68.2 75.8 66.8 72.2 63.1 71.3 55.8 64.7 Japan
Return on Equity 3.2 -9.8 3.6 -4.0 3.7 -0.3 -2.0 -4.3
Source: Fitch-IBCA data for commercial banks of G-10 countries; banks are ranked by assets in billion
U.S. dollars. All variables are averaged over the 1994-1997 period; the distribution is truncated at the top
and bottom 10 percent.
For banks in the bottom quartiles of the cost and profitability distributions, costs
are above 65 percent of gross income and the return on equity is less than half of that of
the best performers; the results are qualitatively the same for European and Japanese20
banks. The heterogeneity of results among banks of roughly the same size is an
indication that there is room for efficiency gains. For the largest banks, with assets
above $50 billion, there is less heterogeneity, at least in North America (except for the
share of non-interest income, which varies widely, perhaps due to the simultaneous
presence of traditional intermediaries and more innovative banks). This could be due to
the fact that the largest banks largely operate in wholesale markets where there is more
competition and less room for complacent behavior. For European and Japanese banks,
the differences between the top and bottom quartiles are similar to those recorded for
the smaller banks; again, heterogeneity indicates room for efficiency improvement.
3.2  Cost and Profit Efficiency
Efficiency is almost always measured relative to a domestic benchmark;
international comparisons of efficiency levels are problematic because the best banks of
each country operate with different technologies that are not directly comparable.
For the U.S. and Europe most studies of cost efficiency find that retail banks
operate on average at between 10 and 20 percent below the efficient cost frontier, i.e.,
their costs are higher by 10 to 20 percent than those of the best institutions.
14
For Japanese banks, the gap between the best and the average practice institution
(the average cost inefficiency) is around 5 to 7 percent;
15 this means that M&As are
likely to bring about smaller efficiency improvements than in banking systems with a
higher dispersion of efficiency scores, i.e. with a greater difference between the best
practice banks (potential acquirers, that could transfer their superior management skills)
                                                                
14 See, for example, Berger and Humphrey (1997) for the U.S. and Altunbas, Molyneux and Thornton
(1997) and Schure and Wagenvoort (1999) for Europe. Schure and Wagenvoort study 2000 European
banks during the years 1993-1997 (i.e., after the implementation of the European Union’s Second
Banking Directive of 1988 and the adoption of the Single Market of 1992) and show that, on average,
costs could be reduced by 16 percent; in the period examined, banks in some countries — such as the
U.K., the Netherlands and Italy — achieved rapid cost-efficiency improvements, while in other countries
— such as France and Germany — banks had yet to start slimming down.
15 See Altunbas, Liu, Molyneux and Seth (2000). However their definition of output (total loans,
securities and off-balance sheet items) is somewhat different from the traditional specification and makes
their results hard to compare to others.21
and the others. The reduction of this gap relative to the eighties (when it was estimated
to be approximately 14 percent, i.e. the same level of output could have been produced
by Japanese banks with 14 percent fewer resources)
16 indicates that after the crisis of the
nineties Japanese banks operate closer to their efficient frontier. However it is important
to bear in mind that efficiency indicators are relative measures of performance, and say
nothing on the efficiency of the industry as a whole compared to banks of other
countries.
The average efficiency of Australian banks is low (58 percent in 1996) compared
to best-practice banks;
17 once more, this only means that the distance of Australian
banks  from their efficient frontier is higher than elsewhere, and does not imply that
they are in worse shape, as it is impossible to compare directly industries that have
production functions with different shapes. The efficiency ratios of Australian credit
unions have been found to be 80 to 90 percent. However, taking into account  the
subsidies received by some credit unions, such as volunteer labor, free office space, etc.,
the efficiency ratios drop to around 60 percent.
18
As for banks’ profit efficiency, estimates are more dispersed. Their average is
around 50 percent: the average bank could be twice as profitable.
19 However, these
estimates are more sensitive to the specification used to measure them than are
estimates of cost efficiency and are thus less robust. In general, their dispersion suggests
that profits are more driven than costs by firm-specific factors such as management
quality or unobservable characteristics of local demand. Therefore, there seems to be
more potential for improving the overall performance of an inefficient target by
increasing revenues than by reducing costs.
                                                                
16 See Fukuyama (1993).
17 Sathye (2001) investigates the technical and allocative efficiency of Australian banks using Data
Envelopment Analysis.
18  See Esho (2001). Efficiency estimates of credit unions are usually performed separately from those
of standard commercial banks, mainly because of differences in regulation and corporate objectives,
although the same analytical framework is usually applied.
19 See, for example, Berger and Humphrey (1997), Berger, Hancock and Humphrey (1993), and
Demsetz and Strahan (1997).22
A caveat to this conclusion comes from the fact that, according to the duality
theorems briefly recalled in section 2, the cost and profit functions are both duals of the
production function. In fact, given the complexity of a bank’s production function (a
multiple input – multiple output firm with unobservable quality of some inputs and
outputs and a degree of endogeneity in the determination of prices), efficiency estimates
based on manipulation of regression residuals are subject to both specification and
measurement error. One study finds very little correlation between cost and profit
efficiency measures;
20 this may reflect endogenous output prices: banks may differ in
their market power either because they operate in different markets or because they
specialize in some product niche; in this case they might have higher-than-average
profits (thus seeming profit efficient) but can also afford some slack in cost control
(thus seeming cost-inefficient). Alternatively, banks with (unobservable) high-quality
products have higher profits but also higher production costs. In any event, further joint
analysis of cost and profit efficiency would shed some light on estimation issues.
3.3  M&As and Cost Efficiency
The studies that analyze the direct effect of M&As on banks’ efficiency have been
performed on the basis both of balance sheet ratios and of multivariate cost and profit
functions. The evidence on the effects of the deals on cost efficiency varies by country.
For the U.S. there is little evidence of any improvement in cost efficiency
following a merger. In particular, there seems to be no decrease in non-interest expenses
or total costs and no improvement in operating income; cost efficiency also shows very
little improvement. 
21
The evidence for European banks is broadly consistent with these results:
domestic mergers among banks of equal size improve cost efficiency, but this result
                                                                
20 See Berger and Mester (1997).
21 See Srinivasan (1992), Berger and Humphrey (1992b), Linder and Crane (1993), Pilloff (1996) and
DeYoung (1997).23
does not hold for all countries.
22 Simulation evidence suggests that cross-border
acquisitions may be associated with a reduction in the costs of the target, while little
effect is found for domestic M&As.
23 The difficulties in improving cost efficiency may
be related to the obstacles encountered, especially in continental Europe, to reducing
banks’ labor force. In fact, personnel reductions, one of the main sources of savings, are
hardly an option in countries with rigid labor markets.
24
The evidence of studies that use more recent data is mixed. A number of studies
for the U.S. finds that mergers produce no improvement in banks’ cost efficiency,
25
especially for the deals that involve very large banks.
26 This may be due to the
organizational diseconomies of operating larger enterprises – disruptions from the
M&A process may offset most potential efficiency gains. However, another study finds
cost reductions also for very large U.S. banks.
27  For the U.K., significant productivity
gains are associated with mergers stemming from reduced inefficiency;
28 these results
are consistent with the transfer of assets to a more productive management.
3.4  M&As and Profit Efficiency
Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997) find little change in cost efficiency but
an improvement in profit efficiency of large U.S. banks after M&As, especially if both
                                                                
22 See Vander Vennet (1996).
23  Altunbas, Molyneux and Thornton (1997) look at the cost implications of hypothetical cross-
border mergers, and find that most possible mergers yield no cost efficiencies. They estimate a cost
function over the existing sample of banks, then artificially merge banks by adding the quantities and
averaging the prices of their inputs and outputs. This methodology does not allow for the payment of any
premiums on the stock of the acquired firm nor for any transactions costs associated with the merger.
Neither does it allow for any efficiency gain or synergies that would arise from altering input or output
levels, which are typically the principal stated purpose for mergers.
24  See Focarelli, Panetta and Salleo (2002) for an analysis of the Italian market for bank M&As.
25 See Peristiani (1997) which, unlike most studies, includes in its sample mergers that are essentially
corporate reorganizations, e.g., mergers of two banks that are subsidiaries of the same bank holding
company. See also, Berger (1998) and Rhoades (1998).
26 See Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Berger (2000).
27  See Houston, James and Ryngaert (2001). Interestingly, this study finds that the effect of revenue
enhancement is not very important.
28 See Haynes and Thompson (1999).24
merger participants were relatively inefficient prior to the merger.
29 They find that, after
merging, banks shift their portfolios to take on more loans and fewer securities. Their
measure of profit efficiency does not account for changes in risk likely to result from
such a portfolio switch; they assume that equity markets would recognize and account
for any such change. They attribute gains in profit efficiency to the benefits of risk
diversification: larger banks have more diversified loan portfolios and lower equity-
asset ratios.
30  These results may come from using a sample of U.S. banks from 1980-
90, a period that coincided with the gradual lifting of the ban on interstate transactions,
which allowed banks from different states, each with geographically concentrated
portfolios, to merge and thus diversify their holdings.
31  In addition, their findings that
there is little effect on market power from large bank mergers may not translate from
the United States to countries with different antitrust regulations. Berger (1998) finds
similar results in a study that includes all U.S. bank mergers, both large and small, from
1990 to 1995.
The evidence for Europe suggests that more efficient banks tend to acquire
institutions in worse shape.
32 Vander Vennet (1996) finds that domestic mergers of
equals in EC countries have a positive impact on profitability, mainly driven by
improvements in operational efficiency. However, he does not find performance
improvements in full or partial domestic acquisitions of one bank by another. Vander
Vennet’s analysis does not control for the correlation of many of the balance sheet
variables that he examines. Focarelli, Panetta and Salleo (2002) find that Italian deals
that consist of the purchase of the majority (but not all) of the voting shares of the target
appear to result in significant improvements, mainly due to a decrease in bad loans. For
                                                                
29 Other relevant studies include Berger (2000), Berger, Hancock and Humphrey (1993), Berger,
Humphrey and Pulley (1996), Berger and Mester (1997) and Clark and Siems (1997).
30 This paper has an unusual sample: it excludes M&As in which the banks involved remained
separate corporate entities after the consolidation, but includes mergers between banks that are
subsidiaries of the same holding company. It is not clear what effect the inclusion in the sample of these
corporate reorganizations has on the results.
31 Consistent with this view, Berger and DeYoung (2000) find that some banking organizations are
efficiently managed on a cross-regional basis.
32 Berger and Humphrey (1992b) find similar results for the U.S.25
full mergers they observe that Italian banks aim to change their business focus towards
providing financial services and thus increase their non-interest income, rather than to
obtain efficiency gains. After the merger, they observe an increase in profitability in the
long run that is related also to a more efficient use of capital.
3.5  Scale and Scope Economies
Perhaps the most commonly quoted source of potential gains from M&As is the
exploitation of scale economies. Banks that increase significantly their size by merging
with others may have the opportunity to access cost-saving technologies or to spread
fixed costs over a larger base, thus reducing average costs and improving profitability.
33
Most research on the existence of scale economies in retail commercial banking
finds a relatively flat U-shaped average cost curve, with a minimum somewhere around
$10 billion of assets, depending on the sample, country and time period analyzed. Most
of these studies suggest that efficiency gains from the exploitation of scale economies
disappear once a certain size is reached and that there might be diseconomies of scale
above some threshold, presumably due to the complexity of managing large institutions
or to the difficulties that arise when a bank’s geographical coverage increases. This
result is fairly robust and holds for the U.S., Europe and Canada.
34 However, it relies
mainly on data from the 1980s and early 1990s and, because of the small number of
very large banks, relies on data from firms mostly below the size of the average bank in
many countries. Also, this result might have to be revised due to recent technological
                                                                
33 Notice, however, that many of the same gains could be achieved by outsourcing typical back office
functions.
34 For  the U.S., see Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey (1987), Berger and Mester (1997), Hughes and
Mester (1998), Hunter, Timme and Yang (1990) and Noulas, Ray and Miller (1990). European references
include Altunbas and Molyneux (1996), Salleo (1999) and Schure and Wagenvoort (1999); Mendes
(1999) finds that smaller Portuguese banks are less efficient but face economies of scale while larger
banks are more efficient but face diseconomies of scale.  Lang and Welzel (1996) find moderate scale
economies for all size classes but conclude that this cannot be generalized to the entire German banking
sector given the small size of the banks in the sample. For Canada, see Breslaw and McIntosh (1997).26
changes that imply large fixed costs and thus have the potential for scale economies
even for larger banks.
35
On the other hand, studies of Japanese banks do find increasing returns to scale
for banks of all sizes, including the largest banks. One study found that inefficiency in
Japanese banks stemming from the minimum efficient scale is less than 2 per cent on
average. Roughly 93 per cent of Japanese banks exhibited non-constant returns to scale
– 81 per cent of them were operating with increasing returns to scale (the rest showed
decreasing returns to scale). As for different size classes, the majority of the small and
medium-sized banks exhibited increasing returns to scale and anywhere from one-third
to one-half of the larger banks in the survey still displayed increasing returns to scale.
36
Another study found no evidence of economies of scope in Japanese banking, but did
find that Japan’s largest banks exhibited “appreciable scale economies.” This result is
attributed to the universal banking model in Japan, which provides banks with lower
monitoring costs for their lending portfolios because of their direct participation in the
ownership of many Japanese commercial businesses.
37
Hughes, Mester and Moon (2001) argue that most research finds no economies of
scale because it ignores differences in banks’ capital structure and risk taking. They find
evidence that small banks hold more capital than the cost-minimizing level, a result that
they attribute to the protection of their charter values, while large banks have less than
the cost-minimizing level of capital, perhaps because they exploit government subsidies
to banks that are “too big to fail.” The authors find that scale economies are positively
associated with bank size and diversification and negatively associated with balance
sheet measures of risk. They argue that scale economies are present if risk is held
constant, but that these economies are masked by increased costs associated with the
greater risk of larger banks.
                                                                
35 See Berger, DeYoung, Genay and Udell (2000).
36 See Fukuyama (1993).
37 See McKillop, Glass and Morikawa (1996).27
Evidence for Japan also suggests that controlling for risk reverses the more
traditional results on the existence of scale economies in banking. Controlling for risk
and quality factors, Altunbas, Liu, Molyneux and Seth (2000) find that the optimal bank
size actually decreases, suggesting that advantages can be realized if the largest banks
become smaller. This result probably reflects the fact that larger banks have seemingly
lower costs but (at least in Japan) they take on proportionally more risk; once this is
accounted for, scale diseconomies may appear.
The different results obtained for the U.S. and Europe on one side, and Japan on
the other are perhaps not surprising given the great differences between their regulatory
frameworks and financial conditions in the late 1990s.  During this period, American
and European banks were in good financial conditions and were exploiting legislation
that expanded opportunities to diversify geographically and across product lines. At the
same time, most Japanese banks were in severe financial straits and were in no
condition to expand into new activities.
Probably the second most quoted reason for M&As is the exploitation of
synergies, or economies of scope: by merging with institutions specialized in different
market segments, it is claimed that banks can improve their production process and
cross-sell their products to a larger customer base. Measuring the existence and extent
of economies of scope is especially difficult, given that, in theory, the benchmark
should consist of single-product firms. The lack of such firms casts doubts on the
reliability of results in this particular field.
The analysis of universal banking, conducted on European data, searches for
complementarities between loans and investment-related services; however, no strong
evidence has been found in favor of or against the joint provision of different services,
38
but this might be due to measurement problems involving economies of scope. Scope
economies have, however, been identified in smaller institutions.
39 Research using
American data  has found find little or no revenue scope economies between bank
                                                                
38 See Allen and Rai (1996) and Lang and Welzel (1998).
39 See Lang and Welzel (1996).28
deposits and loans.
40 Some research has suggested that financial conglomerates are
more revenue efficient than specialized institutions; universal banks appear to be more
cost and profit efficient than non-universal banks.
41  The true test might be about to
come, when a fully unified European market will see specialized and universal banks
compete against each other.
3.6  Shareholders’ Value
The last indicator of efficiency gains is the stock market performance of merging
banks. The main finding of U.S. event studies that look at share prices around the time
that a deal is announced is that, on average, total shareholder value (i.e., the combined
value of the bidder and the target) is not affected by the announcement of the deal since,
on average, the bidder suffers a loss that offsets the gains of the target.
42 Therefore,
M&As imply a transfer of wealth from the shareholders of the bidder to those of the
target. Interestingly enough, these results are similar to those for nonfinancial firms;
43
this points in the direction of a more general problem associated with the corporate
governance of M&As. The evidence for the nineties is more favorable. Compared to the
eighties, average abnormal returns have been higher for both bidders and targets.
44
One problem with event studies is that the announcement of a deal mixes
information concerning the proposed merger with information on its financing. Because
investors consider the announcement of a stock issuance as “bad news”,
45 the negative
returns to the bidding bank could reflect the fact that mergers tend to be financed with
stocks. Consistent with this notion, one study finds that the returns to bidders are
                                                                
40 See Berger, Humphrey and Pulley (1996)  and Noulas, Miller and Ray (1993).
41 See Vander Vennet (1996).
42 Rhoades (1994) and Pilloff and Santomero (1998) provide a survey of event studies. See also,
Hannan and Wolken (1989) and Houston and Ryngaert (1994). However, Cornett and Tehranian (1992)
find positive overall returns from banking M&As.
43 See Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001).
44 See Houston, James and Ryngaert (2001).
45 See, e.g., Myers and Majluf (1984).29
significantly higher when mergers are financed with cash relative to mergers financed
with new equity.
46
Some studies have examined the stock market reaction to different types of deals.
However, even these papers find no clear cut evidence on the efficiency effects of
M&As. Houston and Ryngaert (1994) find that the combined gains tend to be greater
when the bidding firm is unusually profitable or there is significant overlap between
institutions. The first result is consistent with a market for corporate control favoring
competent over incompetent managers; the second result is consistent with a market
power hypothesis, according to which higher market share leads to higher profits.
47
DeLong (2001) finds that mergers that focus banks geographically or in product space
create value while those that diversify them don’t. On the other hand, Zhang (1995)
finds results consistent with a diversification hypothesis, according to which
geographical diversification leads to a lower variability of income; he finds that out-of-
market transactions create value for shareholders.
Higher market concentration created by consolidation is likely to lead to an
increase in prices for retail financial services, leading in turn to an increase in profits.
However, it is also true that firms operating in more concentrated markets are generally
found to be less efficient:
48 this might offset the gains from an increase in market power
and thus leave unchanged the market value of the bank.
In the only event study of mergers in European banking markets, Cybo-Ottone
and Murgia (2000) find positive and significant gains in shareholder value from
domestic bank mergers, but not from cross-border deals. They find gains both from a
subsample of 54 bank-bank combinations and from a subsample of 18 mergers of banks
and non-banks. However, their positive abnormal returns do not necessarily mean that
mergers improve efficiency; in fact, one possible explanation for the difference between
                                                                
46 See Houston and Ryngaert (1997).
47 See  Houston and Ryngaert (1994) and Hawawini and Itzhak (1990).
48 See Berger  and Hannan (1998) on the relationship between market concentration and efficiency.30
the European and American markets is that weaker antitrust enforcement in some
European countries allows gains in monopoly power from in-market mergers.
3.7   Discussion of the Main Results
In conclusion, the empirical evidence suggests that commercial bank M&As do
not significantly improve cost and profit efficiency and, on average, do not generate
significant shareholder value. There is evidence in favor of exploiting scale economies,
but only up to a size well below that of the most recent large deals. Economies of scope
are harder to pin down; there is no clear-cut evidence of their existence.
These results seem to contradict the motivations given by practitioners for
consolidation — which are largely related to issues of scale and scope economies and to
improvements in management quality — and could indicate that expected efficiency
gains cannot be achieved: organizational diseconomies of scale could offset any gains in
scale efficiencies arising from technologies or scope economies from diversification.
However, there are other possible explanations for the divergence between the
econometric evidence and bankers’ beliefs.
One possibility is that the deals done in the past might have suffered from stricter
regulation. For example, the limitations imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act on the range
of U.S. banks’ financial activities could have impeded the realization of gains from
cross selling. Similarly, restrictions on bank branching or to geographic expansion could
have hampered the exploitation of scale economies. This view suggests that the
deregulation of banking under way in all major countries (e.g., the Riegle-Neal Act or
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in the U.S.) might increase the potential for scale and
scope economies. The evidence available for the nineties is consistent with this view.
A second possibility is that the lack of clear-cut results on the effect of M&As
could reflect difficulties in measuring the improvements in efficiency. First, during a
merger wave the construction of a satisfactory control sample of non-merging banks —
which serves as a benchmark for comparison — could be very difficult: in any given
year there could be only a handful of banks not involved in mergers in the previous31
years or in the next ones.
49 Moreover, even if such a control sample could be
constructed, the performance of the non-merging banks might be influenced indirectly
by the consolidation of their competitors. The former could react to M&As of their
rivals by improving their efficiency, or by widening the range of products offered to
their customers. Thus, measured gains from mergers relative to the control sample could
understate actual gains. Second, mergers may be associated with a redistribution of
resources among various stakeholders. If M&As are associated with an increase in
competition — as it was the case in many countries in the nineties
50 — consumers could
reap most of the benefits from consolidation.
51 This distributional change implies that
the profitability ratios or stock returns would not increase even when the efficiency of
the consolidating banks improves.
52 Given the difficulties in measuring efficiency gains,
a promising line of research could consist in analyzing case studies of merging banks in
great detail, in order to select carefully the representative deals and control sample and
capture industry-specific or firm-specific idiosyncrasies.
53
A third alternative that has not been fully analyzed in the previous literature is that
the gains from mergers can only emerge fully after some time. This means that studies
restricted to a short post-merger period might fail to account for the efficiency gains of
consolidation.
54 Long lags in the improvement of performance may reflect difficulties in
                                                                
49 For a discussion of this point see Calomiris and Karceski (2000).
50 For example, Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) show that the Italian banking system has become highly
competitive in the 1990s. Shaffer (1993) finds that the Canadian banking system is highly competitive.
Berger and Humphrey (1992b) show that the relaxation of entry restrictions has considerably increased
competition among U.S. banks. A similar effect was determined by the relaxation of bank branching
restrictions (see Jayaratne and Strahan, 1997).
51 See for example Jayaratne and Strahan (1997).
52 On the other hand, mergers could also be associated with a redistribution of resources from the
employees to the bank through lower wages (see Shleifer and Summers (1988)) or from consumers to
banks, owing to an increase in market power (see Prager and Hannan (1998) for the U.S. and Focarelli
and Panetta (2002) for Italy). In this case, profit ratios of merged banks could improve even when
efficiency is unchanged.
53 See for example Frei and Harker (1996), Calomiris and Karceski (2000) and Rhoades (1998).
54 In an analysis of the effects of M&As in the market for bank deposits, Focarelli and Panetta (2002)
find that in the short run the costs of restructuring the consolidated bank overlay the gains, which cannot
fully emerge for years. In the long run, however, the efficiency gains dominate over the market power
effect, leading to more favorable prices for consumers.32
refocusing lending policies, rationalizing branches, integrating data processing systems
and operations, and training the personnel of the target to market the new owner’s
products.
55 Moreover, culture clashes may be especially harmful in banking,
56 as the
relationships with customers depend heavily on soft information, which is more difficult
to transfer than such objective information as balance sheet data.
57 The resignation of
key executives or the emergence of morale problems due to reassignments or employee
turnover may cause loss of information, especially when the new management has little
time to develop customer information.
Yet another possibility is that — in the presence of agency problems between
managers and shareholders — M&As could be mainly driven by non-value maximizing
motives (such as managerial hubris). Non-value maximizing motivations for M&As
have been analyzed in recent papers that examine the relation between executive
compensation and M&A activity. According to these studies, the motivations for M&As
could be traced back to managers’ desire to increase their compensation (CEOs of larger
institutions earn higher compensation). There is some evidence that CEOs with higher
levels of stock-based relative to cash-based compensation are less likely to lead their
institutions into making acquisitions.
58 Moreover, managers without a large stake in
their banks are more likely to get involved in non-value maximizing mergers.
59
Managerial hubris may be an important reason for the lack of conclusive evidence on
the benefits of M&As among banks. 
60
                                                                
55 Berger, Saunders, Scalise and Udell (1998) and Calomiris and Karceski (2000) mention three years
as the gestation period needed to restructure the merged bank. This squares with the results of the
interviews conducted by the Federal Reserve Board staff with officials of banks involved in mergers (see
Rhoades, 1998). In a study of U.S. bank mergers, Houston, James and Ryngaert (2001) find that cost
savings and revenue gains take two to four years.
56 Practitioners indicate that differences in corporate cultures is one of the main obstacles to the
completion of bank mergers in all the major industrial countries (see Group of Ten, 2001).
57 See, for example, Rajan (1992).
58 See Bliss and Rosen (2000). Similar results on the existence of agency problems in the banking
industry can be found in Gorton and Rosen (1995) and Ryan (1999).
59 See Palia (1993).
60 See Pilloff and Santomero (1998).33
4. Insurance Companies
The insurance industry remains heavily regulated, both in its life and
property/casualty segments; this could be a restraining factor for the consolidation
process, decreasing the possibility of reaping economies of scale and of diversification
by discouraging in particular cross-border deals. Differences in social security systems
could also contribute to the international segmentation of the life insurance industry, if
countries differentiate themselves in such key variables as the age of retirement or the
model of funding (defined benefits or defined contributions). Furthermore, despite a
trend towards deregulation, “cross-border trade in insurance services is limited by
differences in culture, consumer protection laws, taxation, and the need to establish a
local presence to process claims and handle administration”.
61 However, in Europe there
has been greater cross-border integration in the insurance sector than in commercial
banking, suggesting that European insurance managers may be better at dealing with
cross-border barriers and operating efficiently in many nations.
At least within domestic markets, there is a potential for economies of scale and
scope, in particular with other financial products, such as those offered by banks. These
benefits may be obtained through joint ventures or through the combination of banks
and insurance companies, a growing trend, especially in Europe. Finally, the proposition
that there could be efficiency gains by letting the best firms take charge of the others is
even more true in a sector protected, at least to an extent, from outside competition. The
following sections discuss the available evidence on the insurance industry,
distinguishing between the two main lines of business – life and property/casualty.
4.1   Aggregate Data
The insurance industry seems to exhibit economies of scale, at least judging from
a cursory examination of firms’ balance sheet ratios. In the North American life
insurance segment, management expenses as a fraction of net premiums written
                                                                
61 OECD (1998). See also Berger, DeYoung and Udell (2001).34
decrease from 16 percent for the smaller firms to 11 percent for the larger ones; in
Europe the ratio decreases from 9 to 4 percent (see Table 4).
62
Table 4
Size and Performance of Insurance Companies
                                                            Life Insurance Companies by Asset Size
Area Variables < $500 mill. $500 – $2000 mill > $2000 mill.
No. Average No. Average No. Average
Management Expenses
Net Premiums Written 72 16.2 102 14.0 134 10.9 North
America
Return on Equity 71 3.4 104 10.6 135 13.0
Management Expenses
Net Premiums Written 76 8.6 86 5.0 142 4.4
Europe
Return on Equity 99 1.3 76 10.6 134 11.8
                                                          Non-Life Insurance Companies by Asset Size
Area Variables < $100 mill. $100 – $500 mill > $500 mill.
No. Average No. Average No. Average
Management Expenses
Net Premiums Written
254 17.9 364 15.9 216 15.5 North
America
Return on Equity 269 7.2 373 9.2 217 9.5
Management Expenses
Net Premiums Written 117 16.6 156 10.8 144 7.8
Europe
Return on Equity 263 7.2 183 9.3 145 11.2
Source: Fitch-IBCA data for insurance companies; firms are ranked by assets in million U.S.
dollars. All variables are averaged over the 1994-1997 period; the distribution is truncated at the
top and bottom 10 percent.
As for the property/casualty segment of the industry, the ratio decreases from 18
to 16 percent in North America and from 17 to 8 percent in Europe. In terms of
profitability, a consistent pattern emerges: larger firms are more profitable than smaller
ones. In North America, the return on equity increases from 3 to 13 percent for the life
segment and from 7 to 10 percent for property/casualty firms; in Europe, it increases
from 1 to 12 percent for life companies and from 7 to 11 percent for the
property/casualty firms.
                                                                
62 The difference in cost levels between North America and Europe might depend on different
definitions of the varables. Because of the smaller number of Japanese firms in the available sample, they
are not included in the analysis.35
If the dispersion of cost and profit measures is used as a proxy of efficiency, then
North American insurance companies appear to differ substantially in their
performance: for each size class and each segment of the industry, the costs of those in
the worst quartile are more than double those in the best quartile and profitability is half
as high (see Table 5).
Table 5
 Dispersion of Performance Measures of Insurance Companies
                                                          Life Insurance Companies by Asset Size















10.8 20.6 8.9 17.8 6.5 15.2 North
America
Return on Equity 10.6 0.0 14.7 6.6 17.3 9.1
Management Expenses
Net Premiums Written 3.4 12.9 2.5 6.7 3.0 5.6
Europe
Return on Equity 6.7 0.0 13.9 6.2 16.2 6.7
                                                                      Non-Life Insurance Companies by Asset Size
















13.3 22.2 12.7 18.2 12.5 18.5 North
America
Return on Equity 10.1 4.4 12.9 5.5 12.5 6.1
Management Expenses
Net Premiums Written 10.0 23.2 4.4 16.1 1.8 12.7
Europe
Return on Equity 13.3 0.0 13.2 5.2 14.8 8.2
Source: Fitch-IBCA data for insurance companies; firms are ranked by assets in million U.S.
dollars. All variables are averaged over the 1994-1997 period; the distribution is truncated at the
top and bottom 10 percent.
The European industry reflects more or less the same pattern, suggesting that
insurance companies in general could benefit from a consolidation process that would
allow them to exploit scale economies and transfers of high-quality managerial skills.
Of course, if the consolidation process goes too far, offsetting costs, such as those
associated with the exercise of market power, may arise.36
4.2   Cost and Profit Efficiency
The increase in productivity observed for insurance companies in all countries has
been attributed to technical progress.
63 However, efficiency scores vary widely by
countries, the U.S. firms being on average the most efficient, i.e. with the least
dispersion – the usual caveat applies on the non-comparability of efficiency scores
obtained from different cost (or profit) functions (in this case, from different countries).
Efficiency seems positively correlated with the reinsurance rate and negatively
correlated with the share of life insurance; this might be explained by the national
characteristics of the life insurance market, which deter foreign entry and thus decrease
competition, allowing domestic firms to grow complacent.
U.S. property/casualty insurance companies operate at an efficiency level that
varies from 80 percent of the best practice assessed for the medium-sized companies to
90 percent for the large ones, suggesting that competition keeps them from becoming
too inefficient and that significant improvements from M&As are likely only for the
firms in the worst conditions. The average inefficiency level in the life segment of the
insurance industry is higher, between 35 and 50 percent.
64
Cummins, Tennyson and Weiss (1999) find that M&As improve the efficiency of
target insurance firms.  Because there is no evidence of increases in concentration in
insurance product lines, they argue that market power is unlikely to be a motivation for
mergers. Thus, the foreseeable consolidation process could benefit the industry by, for
example, rationalizing the agency distribution system.
As noted by Ferrier (1999), however, their use of data envelopment analysis
commingles inefficiency with all other sources of error in their estimation, and their
estimates of efficiency differences lack standard errors that would allow them to
measure the significance of their results.
                                                                
63 See Donni and Fecher (1997), who use nonparametric estimation to measure the technical
efficiency of the insurance industry in the OECD countries.
64 See Cummins and Weiss (1993) and Gardner and Grace (1993) for property/casualty results and
Yuengert (1993) for life insurance results.37
The evidence for other countries points toward a larger gap between the best
practice firms and the rest of the industry: the average efficiency level is around 50
percent for France and Belgium, around 50 percent and growing in Germany and a little
higher in the British life-insurance industry.
65 Given that efficiency seems to be higher
in countries where the regulatory burden is lower, deregulation could help close the
efficiency gap by introducing more competition.
4.3  Scale and Scope Economies
Scale economies in the U.S. insurance industry have been studied extensively.
Property/casualty insurance companies show evidence of scale economies for small and
intermediate-size firms, suggesting that consolidation among them may reduce average
costs. On the other hand, larger firms exhibit diseconomies of scale. Finally, there is no
evidence of scope economies at any size level. As for the life insurance industry, scale
economies are found up to $15 billion of assets, but it is unclear whether the result holds
for larger firms.
66
The evidence for European markets is more mixed, but in general it is in favor of
the existence of scale and scope economies.
67 Scale economies for life insurance have
also been found for Japanese and Canadian companies.
68 However, most studies use
data from the early 1990s; the sweeping changes in regulation and technology that took
place in recent years might have affected deeply the cost and revenue structure of the
industry. Past results, therefore, should be considered with caution.
                                                                
65 See Delhausse, Fecher, Perelman and Pestieau (1995) for France and Belgium, Mahlberg and Url
(2000) for Germany, and Rees and Kessner (1999) for the U.K.
66 For property/casualty results, see Cummins and Weiss (1993) and Hanweck and Hogan (1996). For
life results, see Yuengert (1993) and Cummins and Zi (1998). Grace and Timme (1992) find evidence of
scale economies throughout their sample of life insurance firms, but they do not control for differences in
the output of small and large companies.
67 Focarelli (1992) finds evidence of scope economies for the life and property/casualty segments in
the Italian industry; see also Prosperetti (1991). Fecher, Perelman and Pestieau (1991) find significant
scale economies for both segments of the French industry. Mahlberg and Url (2000) find significant scale
economies for the German market, and Kaye (1991) finds them for the British life insurance companies.
68 See Fukuyama (1997) for Japan and McIntosh (1998) for Canada. Given the small number of firms
in the Canadian insurance industry, McIntosh is forced to estimate a very restrictive model with one
output measure that incorporates all insurance products.38
As in other financial industries, scope economies are more elusive; the
coexistence of specialized life and property/casualty insurance companies within
insurance conglomerates probably means that neither diversifying nor specializing is the
single winning strategy. Diversification between life insurance and property/casualty
insurance produces, on average, scope diseconomies and is more suited to large insurers
emphasizing personal lines of business and with vertically integrated distribution
systems than it is for small insurers specializing in commercial lines of business.
69
These results may be related to the desire of those buying personal lines of insurance for
the convenience of buying multiple products from one supplier, but measures of
convenience are not included in estimated profit efficiency equations.
5. Investment Banks and Asset Management Companies
M&As involving investment banks, as well as joint ventures and strategic
alliances, are increasingly common, especially between British and American
investment banks and continental European commercial banks that are trying to
establish a global presence. Cross-industry M&As involving investment banks and
securities dealers have been plentiful, because within the financial services sector the
latter is perceived to be a growth business.
The wave of consolidation in the asset management industry has been widely
driven by round-the-clock trading, the Internet, globalization, and other technology-
driven advances.
70 Consolidation is also resulting from consumers’ desire for the
convenience of one-stop shopping. Japan and Europe are expected to be growth areas in
the future because they have lagged behind the U.S. institutional asset management
industry.
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5.1   Investment Banks: Aggregate Data
The heterogeneity of the investment banking industry, broadly defined, makes it
difficult to organize a meaningful comparison across countries and size groups. The
following is a tentative analysis that gives the flavor of the main differences across
operators.
The investment banking industry seems more oriented towards medium-sized and
larger firms (more than 100 employees) in North America, while in Europe small and
medium-sized firms (fewer than 1.000 employees) dominate; this is partly due to the
inclusion in the sample of organizations created mainly for tax optimization purposes.
In particular, many institutions incorporate a subsidiary (with very little staff compared
to headquarters) in countries with a favorable tax treatment of their typical sources of
income. While comparing costs and revenues across size classes makes little sense,
given the vastly different horizons of firms belonging to different size brackets, for this
globalized sector interesting evidence can be drawn from cross-country comparisons.
North American medium-sized investment banks seem to have higher costs per
employee than their European counterparts (respectively $314,000 and $210,000), but
their employees seem more productive ($171,000 of net income per worker versus
$91,000 in Europe). In terms of return on equity, European banks are ahead once again
(16.2 percent versus 10.8 percent for their North American competitors) (see Table 6).
For large investment banks, the picture is slightly different: North American
institutions have higher costs per employee than European ones ($262,000 versus
$156,000), slightly lower net income per worker ($39,000 versus $41,000) but a much
higher return on equity (16.2 versus 7.2 percent). This could be due to differences in
capital structure (North American firms might be less capitalized than European ones)
or to institutional features such as differences induced by the specialization of American
banks (due to lingering effects of the Glass-Steagall Act) versus the universal bank
approach of many European countries.40
Table 6
Size and Performance of Investment Banks
Area Variables < 100 employees   100 - 1.000
employees
  >1.000 employees
    No. Average Standard
Deviation No. Average Standard
Deviation No. Average
Operating costs
per employee 3 336 113 15 314 234 13 262
Net Income per
Employee 3 295 304 15 171 394 13 39 North
America
Return on Equity 3 8.8 8.9 15 10.8 13.8 13 16.2
Operating costs
per employee 57 561 2117 52 210 83 9 156
Net Income per
Employee 57 353 1451 52 91 81 9 41 Europe
Return on Equity 57 10.8 17.9 52 16.2 18.2 9 7.2
 Source: Fitch-IBCA data for investment banks of G-10 countries; all variables are averaged over the 1994-1998
period; investment banks are ranked by their average number of employees over the sample period. Operating costs
and net income are in thousands US dollars, reutrn on equity is expressed as a percentage value
5.2  Efficiency and Economies of Scale and Scope
Unfortunately, there are no studies that examine rigorously the cost and profit
performance of investment banks or asset management companies before and after
mergers.
A survey of corporate strategies in the 1990s which includes case studies of recent
consolidation transactions involving investment banks suggests that globalization is the
main force underlying consolidation.
71 Quotes from managers of merging entities
suggest that mergers create business synergies in areas of product offerings, product
development, distribution and service. Earnings growth is often cited as an important
reason for mergers, as is the need for global industry knowledge and global distribution,
which demands global products, services and intelligence.
72 In addition, some
                                                                
71 See Pearson (1998).
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251-257.41
commentators have pointed to the increasing size of deals in recent years and suggested
that banks need to have large balance sheets in order to win business and participate in
various large loan syndications and equity and debt underwriting.
73
Limited analytical research on scale and scope economies is available for the
securities industry. In the U.S. economies of scale seem to exist among smaller
securities firms, but they are exhausted when the firm reaches between 14 million and
36 million dollars in total revenue and at about 40 million dollars in assets and 4 million
dollars in equity.
74 Larger firms demonstrate scale diseconomies. The limited evidence
available for U.K. firms (whose average efficiency score is around 70 per cent) is
broadly consistent with the U.S. results, suggesting that there are economies of scale up
to a certain scale, while diseconomies of scale set in for larger firms.
75 In contrast,
Italian securities firms (that have low efficiency levels – between 46 and 61 per cent
depending on the measurement method used) are most efficient when they are either
small or large;
76 similarly, one study of the Japanese industry found that Japan's four
largest securities firms were more cost efficient than the smaller firms.
77
A possible interpretation for these divergent results (for the U.S. and the U.K. on
one side and Italy and Japan on the other) is that national characteristics are very
important for this segment of the financial industry. For example, the fact that in Italy
and Japan investment companies are typically part of conglomerates that include a
commercial bank might allow them to  reap the benefits of economies of scale (for
example when expanding the geographical coverage of their activity or integrating the
back office functions for different products). On the contrary, investment firms in the
U.S. and the U.K. might be better off by focusing on their core business, that may not
require a very large size, and let other intermediaries handle other financial services.
Other factors that might influence the optimal size of investment firms in different
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countries are regulation, national habits and the competition prevalent in different
systems. In order to compare these hypotheses a broad comparison of the workings of
national financial industries is needed. However, g iven that Italian and Japanese
securities firms are on average much smaller than their American and British
counterparts, an alternative explanation is simply that these results indicate the existence
of an optimal (relatively small) size of investment firms that holds across countries.
Further work is needed in order to discriminate between the two hypotheses.
As for economies of scope, research suggests that smaller specialty firms exhibit
economies while large multi-product firms exhibit diseconomies. The overall
conclusion, however, is that economies of scope do not appear to be important in the
securities industry. Neither diversified nor specialty firms above the minimum optimal
scale seem to operate at a cost disadvantage.
The results outlined above might be outdated now, given the tremendous amount
of change that has occurred in this sector in recent years. As a consequence, the efficient
scale values found in past research, particularly for securities firms, are likely to change.
As in the case of commercial banks, however, the pattern of economies of scale up to a
relatively small size threshold appears to hold.
 In the case of mutual fund companies, when the scale of activity expands a less
than proportional increase in costs may be recorded both in the area of portfolio
management (information technology and security turnover) and in shareholder
servicing (record keeping and distribution). However, this happens only if asset growth
is not accompanied by a large increase either in the variety of securities in the portfolio
or in the number of accounts.
78 Operational economies of scale are offset by the
complexity induced by learning to deal with a larger nuber of securities and/or
customers.
For a sample of U.S. mutual funds, economies of scale at the management group
level are significant, especially for smaller groups. However, if a fund’s size is
measured by the number of accounts, holding assets per account constant, then scale
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economies are far smaller. In general, there are scale economies in administering mutual
funds in all size categories: the average cost curve of a typical mutual fund is downward
sloping over the entire range of fund assets. For the U.S., the ratio of operating expenses
to fund assets, a proxy of the managerial and administrative efficiency of a fund,
declines steadily as assets grow and reaches a low of 70 basis points for the group of
funds with over $5 billion in assets. In general, large equity funds display significantly
lower operating expense ratios than small funds; the reductions in fund expenses from
efficiency and productivity gains are passed on by service providers as they expand the
scale of their operations.
79
These results are partially consistent with those found for a sample of French
open-end mutual funds, for which significant scale economies are detected only for
small funds, while larger institutions tend to exhibit diseconomies of scale.
80 According
to conventional wisdom, many operating costs of asset management companies are
fixed (e.g. research, trading technologies, back office) and therefore offer the possibility
of exploiting scale economies. This might explain why in general companies with more
assets under management given a fixed number of accounts or of funds offered to
customers have higher margins.
81 However larger companies suffer from a subtle
diseconomy: as the size of a fund grows, it becomes less liquid and less flexible: the
average trade increases in size and becomes costlier, not to mention that it might reveal
valuable information to the market; this will affect negatively the portfolio performance
and thus reduce the appeal of the fund to customers.
82
There is also some limited econometric evidence on the presence of economies of
scope in mutual funds. These results are qualitatively the same as those presented above
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for scale economies, with the exception that economies of scope were found to be
significant for both small and large firms among French open-end mutual funds.
83
The evidence in favor of the existence of some scope economies squares with the
latest developments in the industry. Asset management services are often distributed
jointly with other types of financial products, in order to reap the benefits from cross
selling: in Europe mutual funds are sold by bank branches, while in the U.S. fund
distribution is concentrated in broker-dealers and discount brokers.
84 Also, life
insurance companies tend to have a competitive advantage as do other more specialized
firms that have established cost-effective channels of distribution by using electronic
means. In order to gain access to distribution, fund management expertise and a greater
international presence, a number of cross-border M&As involving asset management
firms have occurred in recent years.
85 As an alternative to M&As, many mutual fund
firms have opted for strategic alliances with banks, securities broker-dealers, and
insurance companies.
6. Cross-Industry and Cross-Border Consolidation
Research on the efficiency effects of M&As across national boundaries and across
financial industries is scarce, largely because there have been relatively few such
acquisitions to date. Most studies are therefore based on simulations and indirect
evidence, such as differing efficiency levels across countries.
The importance of national institutions and market structure in an international
perspective is underlined by a study that compares efficiency for the financial sector
(banks and insurance companies) in the OECD; measures of competition and regulation
are found to be correlated with both efficiency levels and changes.
86 This implies that
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efficient bidders active in cross-border acquisitions might find it difficult to replicate
their domestic success in a different setting.
A study of European banks finds a U-shaped average costs curve and a dispersion
of efficiency measures that suggests possible gains from M&As (at least up to a certain
size threshold); no distinction is made between (potential) domestic and cross-border
deals.
87 Changes in market structure, deriving from deregulation and consolidation,
seem likely to affect mainly institutions operating in markets with low concentration
and low barriers to entry; once more, national differences are shown to affect the
potential effects of consolidation. In a somewhat more narrow international framework,
a study of banking efficiency in the Nordic countries (Finland, Norway and Sweden)
decomposes individual productivity scores into a within-country and an across-country
part. Based on data from 1990, Swedish banks (in particular the larger ones) seem the
more efficient and Finnish ones the least efficient; consolidation among Nordic banks
could thus improve the productivity of their banking systems.
88 However the countries
considered are relatively more similar among them than larger groups of countries (e.g.
the members of the European Union) and therefore cross-country transactions are more
likely to succeed.
Finally, a comparison of Italian and British investment firms (mainly brokerages
and asset management firms) shows the importance of differences in the national
environment; when estimated jointly, firms from both countries have similar levels of
efficiency. However, once cross-country differences are allowed, British firms seem
significantly more efficient than their Italian counterparts.
89 This is more indirect
evidence that theoretical gains from cross-country consolidation should be carefully
evaluated in the light of how national differences influence cost and revenue structures.
However, for lack of deals, there is no strong evidence yet on the results of cross-
country M&As in the financial industry.
                                                                
87 See Ruthenberg and Elias (1996).
88 See Berg, Førsund, Hjalmarsson and Suominen (1993).
89 See Beccalli (2002).46
There are several factors that may cause the efficiency consequences of
international consolidation to be different than those for domestic M&As.  First, there
may be some barriers that inhibit foreign financial institutions from operating efficiently
and competing against domestic institutions.  These barriers may include differences in
language, culture, and regulatory or supervisory structures, and explicit or implicit rules
against foreign competitors. Moreover, even if some competitors appear to have
organizational advantages at home, they are unlikely to be able to apply them abroad
across the board. For example small business lending is highly information-sensitive
and local practices rely heavily on informal mechanisms; in order to avoid adverse
selection problems, foreign banks would have to rely on local expertise, often losing
their competitive advantage. In some cases, the organizational diseconomies of
operating or monitoring from a distance may be exacerbated by having to manage
institutions many time zones away.
90
Second, the market conditions and policies of the home nation may affect cross-
border efficiency. In particular, the home market conditions (e.g., the degree of
competition, the market for corporate control, or securities market development) and
home market policies (e.g., banking powers, prudential regulation and supervision, and
safety net guarantees) condition the environment within which institutions operate.  To
the extent that these differ across countries, institutions will have to adapt or they may
find that the differences affect their efficiency in these international markets. Studies of
cross-border efficiency usually have found that domestic banks are significantly more
efficient than foreign-owned banks.
91  In the most exhaustive study comparing the
efficiency of domestic and foreign banks, Berger, De Young, Genay and Udell (2000)
look at profit and cost efficiency differences in five countries. They find that domestic
banks are generally more efficient than foreign banks, but differences are significant
only in the U.S. When foreign banks are broken down by their country of origin, there
are a number of instances in which foreign banks appear to have an efficiency
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advantage in some countries, with U.S. and German banks more often found to be more
efficient in other countries (however, such comparisons are based on very small samples
- between four and fourteen firms - with the results for German banks being sensitive to
the exclusion of one company).
The primary difference between within- and across-industry M&As is the greater
possibility of scope economies in mergers across industry lines – for example, through
sharing physical inputs, information systems, or databases, or through consumption
complementarities. There is also greater room for scope diseconomies – for example,
from senior management straying far from its area of core competence.
The evidence on the possible impacts of cross-industry consolidation is mixed.
Lown, et al. (2000) compute hypothetical pro forma mergers between the ten largest
U.S. bank holding companies and the ten largest of three other types of financial
institutions: life insurance companies, property/casualty insurance companies and
securities firms. They find that bank-life insurance mergers lead to lower profits but
also to substantially lower risk and conclude that such mergers have the greatest
diversification benefits (Boyd, Graham and Hewitt (1993) find a similar result). This
finding is compatible with the view that the risk of failure of bank holding companies is
likely to decline and stability to increase if they can expand into non-bank financial
activities.
92
However, this conclusion does not hold for all combinations between banks and
non-bank financial firms: Lown, et al. (2000) find that bank mergers with securities
firms lead to slightly higher profits and slightly greater risk and that bank combinations
with property/casualty insurers would lead to lower profits and higher risk. Moreover,
while these results reflect the small number of firms that dominate the financial sector,
they may not reflect the results of combinations among the large number of smaller
firms in these industries. As with all simulations, they cannot anticipate changes in firm
behavior that might result from the combinations. In fact, other studies have found little
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diversification gains from bank-securities firms combinations
93 and increased volatility
of returns and increased risk of failure.
94
The little research that exists on the efficiency effects of actual universal-type
consolidation finds evidence of organizational diseconomies in universal and
international integration but notes that gains from diversification can be higher than
within country and within industry integration.
95
7. Conclusions
There is a general consensus that consolidation in the financial sector is beneficial
up to a certain (relatively small) size in order to reap economies of scale; this holds in
particular for commercial banks and insurance companies. There have been few studies
on economies of scope, due to a lack of data and to measurement problems; the results
are inconclusive as to whether they exist and whether they have been exploited by
mergers.
As for improvements in managerial efficiency, there is no clear evidence that
M&As result in cost reduction. The most recent studies suggest that consolidation may
enhance revenues, although results vary with the countries and deals analysed;
moreover, the gains appear limited in magnitude. Stock markets also seem sceptical of
M&As: on average, at the announcement of a transaction, the combined value of the
firms involved does not vary much, as it should if significant benefits were expected.
Cross-border consolidation is relatively new and little studied; so far there is no
evidence of significant gains.
However, these results are subject to an important caveat, due to the importance
of innovation in shaping firms and markets. On the one hand, innovation may reduce
the cost of accessing the new technology, and therefore decrease the need for larger size
in order to make its adoption profitable, so that even small intermediaries could handle
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tasks that today are out of their reach. On the other hand, there might be cases in which
new systems are profitable only if applied on a large scale, for example in the field of
risk management; in the latter case, the differences between large and small institutions
might increase.
Ex post results of M&As seem to contradict the motivations given by practitioners
for consolidation, which are largely related to issues of economies of scale and scope
and to improvements in management quality. However to a certain extent this puzzle
might be only apparent. The lack of clear-cut results on the effects of M&As could
reflect difficulties in measuring efficiency improvements. Further, studies restricted to
short post-merger periods might fail to detect value gains that can only emerge slowly,
after some years. Moreover, deals done in the past might have suffered from stricter
regulation  that prevented firms involved in M&As from reaping all the benefits of the
deal. Finally, the fact that mergers often happen in waves makes it hard to separate the
effect of single deals from transformations undergone by the industry as a whole.
More detailed data at the firm level are needed to measure accurately scale and
scope economies and to gauge the effects of changes in management. International
comparisons are difficult due to differences in regulation and technology, and the
consequent differences in markets for financial products. However, changes in
regulation and technology within countries have been going on for long enough that it
should be possible to study their impact on the industry.
One issue that deserves more attention in future research is how M&As affect the
risk of the institutions involved and of the industry. Most studies have dealt with the
potential gains from M&As in terms of operating costs and profits, but, given the nature
of financial institutions, the trade-off with risk is crucial for a general assessment of the
effects of consolidation. Finally, an international coverage that would apply broadly
similar methodologies to a wide range of countries for a sufficient time span would help
distinguish what are the deep parameters that govern the evolution of the financial
industry from characteristics that stem from national practices or regulations.References
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